Many people were surprised when the Supreme Court rendered its judgment reopening the Kuratong Baleleng case. The said case was already dismissed by the Court of Appeals two years ago at the instance of the accused. Senator Lacson is one of the principal suspects of the case. In line with this, speculation is widespread that the senator would spend Christmas in jail.
It is a basic rule in court of justice that dismissed cases can no longer be opened because such prior judgment becomes a bar to subsequent prosecution on the same charged in the former complaint. This is the doctrine of double jeopardy.
My father, last night, asked my opinion about the controversial Lacson case. He told me that the Supreme Court has been unfair with senator Lacson, with the doctrine of double jeopardy as his basis.
The standing that the Supreme Court has committed a grave abuse of discretion or unfair judgment could be tenable BUT I DISAGREE having the double jeopardy as the legal basis. The Rules of Court, specifically provides double jeopardy as:
When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information…after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction pr acquittal or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged…(RULE 117; sec. 7, emphasis added)
The present case clearly is not a double jeopardy issue. Although the case has been dismissed, It is not dismissed on the merits. It shows that the termination of the case is with the express consent of the accused. The accused, including senator Lacson, filed a Motion to Dismiss the case, when it was still in the Court of Appeals. The motion was granted, whereby the case was provisionally dismissed. And as a general rule, provisional dismissal is not a dismissal after all because the case can still be revived through a motion provided that it has not become permanent.
It is evident that the case was provisionally dismissed by the Court of Appeals. The two years period for revival has already lapsed, thereby making the dismissal a de facto permanent dismissal. It is only permanent dismissal-in-fact because there has been no issuance of the order permanently dismissing the case, to wit;
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by… imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. (Rule 117, sec. 8)
In this sense, the kuratong baleleng rob-out case has a two year period to revive prosecution. After the lapse of two years, the provisional dismissal shall be permanent upon issuance of an order from a competent authority.
Two years has already lapse but no revival of the case occurred, neither is there an issuance of an order making the provisional dismissal permanent. Whether or not the kuratong baleleng case be revived?
The Supreme Court answered positively taking the superiority of search for justice as a defense. When the Supreme Court speaks, everybody bows and listen. Whatever the “search for justice” means, only the justices can answer.
